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 1 Evolutionary Psychology and its Critics 
1.1 Convenient Enemies 
The Narrow Evolutionary Psychology Movement represents itself as a major 
reorientation of the social/behavioral sciences, a group of sciences previously dominated 
by something called the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ (SSSM; Cosmides, Tooby, and 
Barkow, 1992). Narrow Evolutionary Psychology alleges that the SSSM treated the mind, 
and particularly those aspects of the mind that exhibit cultural variation, as devoid of any 
marks of its evolutionary history. Adherents of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology often 
suggest that the SSSM owed more to ideology than to evidence. It was the child of the 
1960s, representing a politically motivated insistence on the possibility of changing social 
arrangements such as gender roles: 
 
‘Not so long ago jealousy was considered a pointless, archaic institution in need 
of reform. But like other denials of human nature from the 1960s, this bromide 
has not aged well.’ (Stephen Pinker, endorsement for Buss, 2000)) 
 
This view of history does not ring true to those, like the authors, who have worked in 
traditions of evolutionary theorizing about the mind that have a continuous history 
through the 1960s and beyond: traditions such as evolutionary epistemology (Stotz, 1996; 
Callebaut and Stotz, 1998) and psychoevolutionary research into emotion (Griffiths, 
1990,1997).  
 
The two research traditions that looks most like the supposedly dominant SSSM are 
behavior analysis in psychology and social constructionism across the social and 
behavioral sciences generally. Behaviorism was indeed a dominant paradigm in the 
classic sense until the late 1950s, but it has been in continuous retreat ever since. Social 
constructionism has excited widespread interest ever since its origins in the work of Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), but it has only ever been 
the received view in sub-fields of certain disciplines, such as cultural anthropology. In 
experimental psychology and cognitive science, the two fields that  Narrow Evolutionary 
Psychology is most concerned to reform, social constructionism has never achieved any 
kind of dominance. Furthermore, contrary to the impression given by Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology, the tradition of psychoevolutionary research in the social and 
behavioral sciences is a more or less continuous one leading back through the 
sociobiology and Darwinian anthropology of the 1970s to the longstanding program of 
human ethology whose approach was laid down by Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen 
and whose best known representative is perhaps Irenaus Eibl Eibesfeldt. Thus, what 
Narrow Evolutionary Psychology represents as monolithic ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches to 
the mind are better seen as longstanding oppositions between and within various 
disciplines and sub-disciplines in the human sciences. The central feature of the SSSM, 
the idea that most psychological mechanisms are 'general-purpose' or 'content-
independent', is something many earlier theorists have criticized. Contrary to its 
publicity, Narrow Evolutionary Psychology is not ‘the new science of the mind’: the 
inevitable result of finally putting Darwinism to work in the realm of human affairs. 
Instead, it is the conjunction of two longstanding research traditions, neither of which is 
the only viable option in its own field. These traditions are the classical, representational 
program in cognitive science (Marr, 1982; Fodor, 1983) and the adaptationist form of 
neo-Darwinism that informed ‘70s sociobiology and was popularized by Richard 
Dawkins (Dawkins, 1976).  
 
In this paper we argue that Narrow Evolutionary Psychology inherits the worst failings of 
both of its constituent programs. Its methodology is unsuitable either for making heuristic 
predictions about mental structure that can guide psychological research or for providing 
deep, naturalistic explanations of mental structure. On a more optimistic note, we offer a 
more workable alternative way to garner the heuristic benefits of a biological perspective 
for psychological research and sketch some of the elements that will have to be added to 
the version of evolutionary theory favored by Narrow Evolutionary Psychology in order 
to construct fully naturalistic explanations of mental structure. 
 
1.2 The Evolution of Cognition: A Commitment to Darwinism 
One result of the historical story that accompanies Narrow Evolutionary Psychology is an 
unfortunate tendency to treat all critics of the movement as opponents of evolutionary 
psychology in general, or even of the theory of evolution itself. We want to make it clear 
that we are neither. We are committed to seeking a naturalistic account of cognition, one 
that makes mental processes part of the natural world and their investigation part of 
natural science. This implies that cognition must have evolved like any feature of living 
systems. A fully naturalistic perspective, however, requires more that mere consistency 
with some model of evolution. Naturalism requires that both the model of cognition and 
the model of evolution are themselves devoid of any essential commitments that cannot 
be given a natural explanation. The models must be: 
 
1. Mechanistic  
The entities and processes postulated by the models must be either processes that feature 
in lower-level (‘physical’) theories, or emergent, system-level properties whose 
emergence can be causally explained in terms of lower-level processes. A good example 
of this second sort of explanation is the emergence of structure, such as attractors and 
bifurcations, in the dynamics of complex systems. This structure is emergent in the sense 
that it cannot be predicted from or reduced to regularities governing the activity of the 
systems components. The fact that an unpredictable dynamical structure emerges, 
however, can be fully explained in terms of regularities governing the system 
components. No mysterious extra ingredient is required. In the present context, a key 
implication of mechanism is that functional and design language must be able to be 
exhaustively ‘discharged’ in mechanistic terms. That is, the fact that biological systems 
can be discussed in those terms must be mechanistically explained in much the same way 
that system dynamics can be mechanistically explained.  
 
In the context of biology and cognition, it is also critical to notice that the quest for 
explanatory continuity does not imply the traditional ‘reduction’ of the social to the 
individual and the individual to its parts. The contextual conditions under which systems 
operate are as legitimate a source of explanation as the intrinsic properties of system 
components. The tendency of an asexual species to remain in one region of phenotypic 
space, for example, can be explained in terms of the canalized developmental structure of 
individual organisms or, equally legitimately, in terms of the constraints imposed on the 
species by selection. The more ‘internal’ explanation is not intrinsically preferable to the 
more contextual explanation. In the same way, human development proceeds in a rich, 
‘developmental niche’ constructed by previous generations, and the constraints imposed 
by this niche are a legitimate source of explanation of species-typical traits. 
 
2. Historical  
Naturalistic models of cognition and other features of biological form must be consistent 
with the historical emergence of these features over time. Historical explanations that 
depend on the presence of unique sets of conditions presented in the correct sequences 
are not less satisfactory than explanations using general laws that apply across a wide 
range of initial conditions. In fact, the nature of biological systems provides reasons to 
expect historical explanations to be prevalent. Biological species are historical lineages 
capable of unlimited evolutionary change, not natural kinds of organisms, and so do not 
feature in traditional, universal laws of nature (Hull, 1984; Griffiths, 1999). The best 
candidates for traditional laws in evolutionary theory are ecological generalizations in 
which species and populations figure only as instances of ecological kinds, such as 
‘primary producer’ or ‘current occupant of patch’ (Hull, 1987). But the output of 
processes governed by these ecological laws and generalizations is typically sensitive to 
the initial conditions of the process, so the resultant explanations are likely to be 
historical in nature (O'Hara, 1988).  
 
3. Developmental 
A naturalistic model of an evolved trait must allow a mechanistic understanding of the 
development of that trait both in ontogeny and in its original occurrence as an 
‘evolutionary novelty’. It has been recognized since Darwin himself that the theory of 
natural selection requires a theory of heredity and variation. We argue below that a mere 
reference to gene transfer and random mutation fails to discharge this explanatory 
obligation. Reference to genetic information and a genetic program are still less 
satisfactory, since the literal genetic code is only concerned with protein structure and the 
broader uses of these terms are nothing more than a promissory note to be paid later with 
a full, mechanistic account of developmental biology. That is why molecular genetics and 
molecular developmental biology are important to contemporary evolutionary theory: 
they supply elements of the evolutionary process that have previously had to be assumed. 
As well as filling a gap in our understanding of evolution, the particular way in which the 
gap is filled will have implications for evolutionary theory, as is manifest in the upsurge 
of interest in 'evolutionary developmental biology'. 
 
A dominant theme of the rest of this paper will be the need to consider organisms as 
situated in a natural environment. In different ways, this is the key to meeting all three of 
the obligations we have outlined. Mechanistic explanations of complex systems typically 
require as much attention to the constraints imposed on those systems by their context as 
to the constraints imposed by their constituents. The sorts of historicized evolutionary 
explanations that we have described above are contextual in this way: they attend to the 
historical conditions in which the organism evolved. Finally, the explanatory strategy in 
developmental biology most likely to leave promissory notes scattered about is one that 
localizes control of development in a single material resource. Single causes in 
development derive their specific effects from the context in which they operate. While it 
can be a useful experimental tactic to treat this context as given, this tactic achieves 
experimental tractability precisely by sacrificing explanatory completeness.  
 
In the next section we outline the problem that Narrow Evolutionary Psychologists 
suggest is the primary impediment to progress in cognitive science and the solution that 
they offer to this problem. In section three we argue that this solution is unlikely to work 
and that a more promising alternative is readily available. In section four we turn to the 
account of evolution presupposed by Narrow Evolutionary Psychology and argue that it 
needs to be enriched in various respects before genuinely naturalistic explanations of 
mental processes are possible. 
 2. Cognitive Science in the Dark? 
 
But in many branches of the psychological and behavioral sciences it is today quite 
usual to devise, out of hand, some sort of experimental procedure, apply it to a highly 
complicated system about which next to nothing is known, and then record the results. 
Of course, information can be, and has been gathered by this method… However…we 
prefer to have results before the present interglacial period comes to an end. That is 
why ethology emphatically keeps to well-tried Darwinian procedures. (Lorenz, 1966, 
p. 274) 
 
Practitioners [of anthropology, economics, and sociology have to] realize that theories 
about the evolved architecture of the human mind play a necessary and central role in 
any causal account of human affairs. …Cognitive scientists will make far more rapid 
progress in mapping this evolved architecture if they begin to seriously incorporate 
knowledge from evolutionary biology and its related disciplines … into their 
repertoire of theoretical tools, and use theories of adaptive function to guide their 
empirical investigations. (Tooby and Cosmides, 1998, p. 195) 
 
In essence, the critique of current cognitive science offered by Narrow Evolutionary 
Psychology is the same as Konrad Lorenz’s earlier complaint against what he liked to call 
'the American behaviorists'. A complex device like the human brain exhibits an 
extraordinary number of regularities, but only some of these can properly be construed as 
facts about how the mind works. The vast majority of regularities are mere side effects 
and are not useful entry points to a systematic understanding of the principles according 
to which the system operates. Without an evolutionary perspective, psychological science 
is groping in the dark. It does not know what it is looking for and when it finds something 
it does not know what it is looking at. To Lorenz, the laboratory-based search for laws of 
behavior seemed as misguided as dropping automobiles from buildings under controlled 
conditions in order to ‘discover the principles governing their operation’. In the same 
vein, advocates of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology argue that empirical psychology 
without an evolutionary perspective has no way to determine whether it is studying 
meaningful units of behavior or mental functioning. The fundamental idea behind Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology is that the natural way to classify behavior and the cognitive 
functioning that underlies behavior is in terms of adaptive design: 
 
The intellectual payoff of coupling theories of adaptive function to the methods and 
descriptive language of cognitive science is potentially enormous. By homing in on 
the right categories -- ultimately adaptationist categories --an immensely intricate, 
functionally organized, species-typical architecture can appear … Just as one can flip 
open Gray's Anatomy to any page and find an intricately detailed description of some 
part of our evolved species-typical morphology, we anticipate that in 50 or 100 years 
one will be able to pick up an equivalent reference work for psychology and find in it 
detailed information-processing descriptions of the multitude of evolved species-
typical adaptations of the human mind, including how they are mapped onto the 
corresponding neuroanatomy and how they are constructed by developmental 
programs. (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 68-69) 
 
2.1 Narrow Evolutionary Psychology: The Past and the Present 
The form of evolutionary theory that figures in Narrow Evolutionary Psychology is 
continuous with that which gave rise to sociobiology, but the emphasis on cognitive 
mechanisms, as opposed to behavior, is new. In fact, sociobiologists criticized the earlier 
ethological tradition for explaining human behavior as the result of evolved mechanisms 
rather than focusing on the direct predictions of evolutionary theory about behavior itself. 
The latter approach had been adopted with considerable success by behavioral ecology 
during the 1960s, just as the ethologists' 'hydraulic model' of mental mechanisms was 
falling into disrepute. In behavioral ecology, behaviors were interpreted as evolutionarily 
stable strategies in competition between and within species. Models of these competitive 
interactions between organisms could be constructed using the new techniques of 
evolutionary game theory and the predictions of these models tested against actual 
behavior. Sociobiology simply sought to extend this successful approach to humans. It 
was argued that sociobiology was superior to ethology because it made predictions about 
behavior and tested them rather than merely describing behavior and explaining it. This 
led to the hope that evolutionary models could guide psychological research and point it 
towards important phenomena that would otherwise be misunderstood or overlooked. 
The advocates of this new approach and proponents of these arguments included leading 
figures in today’s Narrow Evolutionary Psychology, such as Jerome Barkow (Barkow 
1979). Narrow Evolutionary Psychology has retained the idea that evolutionary theory 
can make predictions to assist the process of psychological discovery, but has become 
strongly critical of the sociobiological emphasis on behavior. According to Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology, the current human environment is so different from that in 
which humans evolved that current behavior is unlikely either to be the same as the 
behavior produced in the past or to have the same effects on biological fitness. For these 
reasons, Narrow Evolutionary Psychology does not use evolutionary theory to predict 
which behaviors will be observed today or which behaviors will be adaptive today. 
Instead, evolutionary theory is used to predict which behaviors would have been selected 
in postulated ancestral environments1. Current human behavior is to be explained as the 
output of the mechanisms that evolved to produce those ancestral behaviors when these 
mechanisms operate under modern conditions. Narrow Evolutionary Psychology also 
adopts the idea that apparently very diverse behaviors may be the manifestations of a 
single, evolved rule under a range of local conditions, an idea which originated in 
‘Darwinian anthropology’ (Alexander 1979; Alexander 1987). Refocusing research on 
the ‘Darwinian algorithms’ that underlie observed behavior, rather than the behavior 
itself lets the evolutionary psychologist ‘see through’ the interfering effects of 
environmental change and cultural differences to an underlying human nature (Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1. about here. 
 
                                                 
1 The simple contrast between earlier sociobiology and today’s evolutionary psychology suggested here is a 
caricature that does not do justice to the earlier researchers, who were often very well aware of the point 
about environmental change. For an account of the historical development of sociobiological methods, see 
chapter 13 of Sterelny & Griffiths (1999). 
  
Narrow Evolutionary Psychology argues that psychological mechanisms must be 
described using the representational, information-processing language of classical 
cognitive science. Behavioral descriptions cannot be used, for the reasons described 
above. Neurophysiological descriptions are an obvious alternative, as they correspond to 
the morphological descriptions given to other, evolved features of human anatomy; but 
the form of evolutionary theory preferred by Narrow Evolutionary Psychology will not 
predict anything about ‘mechanisms’ in this literal sense. The models used in behavioral 
ecology predict which behaviors will be selected but do not predict anything about how 
those behaviors will be produced. If we accept the conventional view in cognitive science 
that indefinitely many different neurological mechanisms could potentially support the 
same behavior, behavioral ecology predicts nothing about neurological structure apart 
from its output when supplied with input of the kind it received in the evolutionary past: 
 
When applied to behavior, natural selection theory is more closely allied with the 
cognitive level of explanation than with any other level of proximate causation. This is 
because the cognitive level seeks to specify a psychological mechanism's function, and 
natural selection theory is a theory of function. (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, p. 284) 
 
What Narrow Evolutionary Psychology refers to as theories about ‘psychological 
mechanisms’ are more accurately described as theories of cognitive functioning – 
theories about the performance profile of the mind.  
 
This fact about the output of adaptationist reasoning fits together neatly with the idea, 
usually attributed to David Marr (Marr, 1982), that explanation in cognitive science 
should proceed simultaneously at three, mutually illuminating levels. The highest level 
concerns the tasks that the cognitive system accomplishes – recovering the shape and 
position of objects from stimulation of the retina, for example. The lowest level concerns 
the neurophysiological mechanisms that accomplish that task – the neurobiology of the 
visual system. The intermediate level concerns the functional profile of those 
mechanisms, or as it is more usually described, the computational process that is 
implemented in the neurophysiology. The two higher levels of analysis are irreducible 
because each level is multiply realizable at lower levels: the same task can be 
accomplished by different algorithms and the same algorithm can be implemented on 
different hardware. Redescription at a lower level thus results in a reduction in generality.  
 
Insert Figure 2. about here.  
 
Marr argued that adjacent levels of analysis are mutually illuminating and that research 
should be pursued simultaneously at all three levels. Hypotheses about the neural 
realization of the computational level constrain hypotheses about computational 
processes to those that can be realized by the proposed neural systems. Conversely, 
hypotheses about computational processes guide the interpretation of neural structure. It 
makes sense to look for structures that could perform the tasks that need to be performed.  
Similar relations of mutual constraint hold between the level of task description and the 
computational processes. But there remains something of a puzzle as to how the highest 
level, the task description, is to be specified, other than by stipulation. It seems obvious 
that the task of vision is to reconstruct the surrounding objects but why is this the right 
answer? Why is color vision an aid to object recognition, rather than the overall aim of 
vision being aesthetic experience and object recognition only a means to that end? Why 
are visual illusions not the non plus ultra of visual well-functioning? This is essentially 
the problem of providing a natural taxonomy of cognitive function that was encountered 
above. The value of evolutionary theory to cognitive science has been described in many 
ways in the Narrow Evolutionary Psychology literature, but all of these come down to the 
same thing: it provides the task description and thus constrains lower-level hypotheses 
(Figure 3). The purpose for which an organism has been designed by natural selection is 
the task description of that organism and the sub-tasks correspond to separate adaptive 
challenges posed by the ancestral environment: 
 
Evolutionary psychologists expect to find a functional mesh between adaptive 
problems and the structure of the mechanisms that evolved to solve them. (Cosmides, 
et al., 1992, p. 7) 
 
Because the enduring structure of ancestral environments caused the design of 
psychological adaptations, the careful empirical investigation of the structure of 
environments, from a perspective that focuses on adaptive problems and outcomes, 
can provide powerful guidance in the exploration of the mind. (Tooby and Cosmides 
1992, p. 72)  
 
Insert Figure 3. about here. 
 
2.2 Massive Modularity 
One of the best-known aspects of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology is the ‘massive 
modularity thesis’, according to which the mind has few if any domain general cognitive 
mechanisms. Instead, the mind is a collection of separate ‘modules’ each designed to 
solve a specific adaptive problem, such as mate-recognition or the enforcement of female 
sexual fidelity. The massive modularity thesis is the result of reasoning from a very 
general claim about selection pressures to a very general conclusion about the structure of 
the mind. Narrow Evolutionary Psychology claims that evolution would favor multiple 
modules over domain general cognitive mechanisms because each module can be fine-
tuned for a specific adaptive problem. Hence, it is argued, cognitive scientists should look 
for domain specific effects in cognition and should conceptualize their work as the search 
for and characterization of mental modules. 
 
3. Enlightenment from Evolution? 
 
In this section we argue that the proposed evolutionary heuristic for cognitive science – 
the use of evolutionary task descriptions to constrain theories of cognitive function – is 
unworkable. Fortunately, another heuristic, familiar from actual practice in other areas of 
functional anatomy, is available. 
 
The idea that knowledge of evolutionary functions can act as a guide to research into 
cognitive functioning faces an obvious objection. It would seem at first glance that 
knowledge of the selection pressures in distant evolutionary episodes is even harder to 
come by than knowledge of current cognitive functioning. Evolutionary function is an 
epistemically demanding concept, one whose disciplined application requires 
considerable research and which, even then, typically remains highly inferential and 
subject to frequent reappraisal (Brandon, 1990, Ch. 5; Lauder, Armand, & Rose, 1993). 
The actual functioning of cognitive systems, however, is an empirical matter about which 
we can gain experimental knowledge. Moreover, evolutionary functions are unusually 
hard to establish in the case of cognitive functioning. As described above, Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology denies that current behaviors and their ecological effects are 
good evidence for the evolutionary functions of the mechanisms that underlie those 
behaviors. Thus, while most behavioral ecologists can conduct empirical tests of fit 
between observable behavior and the predictions of an evolutionary model, Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology is forced to interpose between the observation and the 
prediction a model of the psychological mechanism that produced the ancestral behavior. 
This second psychological model is used to predict which behavior will occur under 
modern conditions. It is this prediction that is tested against empirical data. A huge 
hypothetical apparatus thus separates the data from the model under test and, as always, 
the test is only as reliable as the assumptions that went into building that apparatus. A 
further difficulty is that behavioral ecologists are typically able to base their evolutionary 
models on empirically derived knowledge of the relevant ecology. Narrow Evolutionary 
Psychology must base its models on reconstructions of past ecologies from 
paleontological and comparative data. 
 
There is a still deeper problem, which we believe is more or less fatal to the proposed 
evolutionary heuristic. Narrow Evolutionary Psychology presumes that evolutionary 
theory can guide psychological research because it can model the selection pressures that 
led to the evolution of traits about which we lack current descriptive knowledge. But, as 
we will now show, the ability to model selection pressures is directly proportional to 
current descriptive knowledge of the form of trait. The heuristic will only work where it 
is not needed! Narrow Evolutionary Psychology argues that knowledge of evolutionary 
function is a guide to the actual form of the mind because: 
 In evolved systems, form follows function. The physical structure is there because it 
embodies a set of programs; the programs are there because they solved a particular 
problem in the past. (Tooby and Cosmides, 1997, p. 13, our emphasis) 
 
The idea is that evolutionary theory can reconstruct the niche in which the human mind 
evolved and predict how the mind will be structured to fit that niche. More precisely, the 
evolutionary theorist will take the complex property of occupying the niche and conduct 
a functional analysis of that property akin to the functional analysis of the mind described 
above. The property of occupying the niche can be thought of as the organisms ‘lifestyle’ 
(e.g., living in a tropical forest eating insects that live under the bark of trees). This 
lifestyle consists of separate tasks (getting up the trees, finding the insects, extracting the 
insects, and so forth). Having created this task description the theorist can predict that the 
organism will have mechanisms that allow it to get up the tree, mechanisms that allow it 
to find the insects and mechanisms that allow it to extract them from under the bark. In 
the same way, it is proposed, we can take the niche that the human mind evolved to 
occupy and functionally analyze the property of occupying that niche in order to 
determine the (functional) structure of the mind.  
 
The trouble with this proposal is that it assumes that we can reconstruct the niche while 
we are ignorant about the structure of the mind. The problem facing Narrow Evolutionary 
Psychology is quite unlike that facing the student of tropical woodpeckers, who can 
identify the relevant niche empirically. It is also unlike that of the paleontologist, who 
knows the form of the woodpecker from the fossil record. What Narrow Evolutionary 
psychologists propose to do is more like a paleontologist who has found fossil birds with 
no skulls and proposes to reconstruct their feeding mode by thinking about the niche they 
occupied. The problem, of course, is that the best way to reconstruct their niche would be 
to look at their beaks and determine for what tasks beaks like that are good. Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology has overlooked the conceptual relationship between an 
evolutionary niche and the organism that fills it. An evolutionary niche is a hyperspace 
whose axes are ranges of tolerance for ecological parameters, parameters that range from 
rainfall to predator density. A simple volume of physical space contains innumerable, 
overlapping niches. To determine the niche of any given species it is necessary to know 
what ecological parameters the species responds to and in what range of those parameters 
a population of that species can maintain itself. The more that is known about an 
organism, the more precisely it is possible to state the dimensions and extent of its niche. 
The ‘woodpecker’ niche described above is laughably underspecified if the aim is to 
explain form. It is indeed occupied by woodpeckers in Borneo and Sumatra, but in New 
Guinea this niche is occupied by arboreal marsupials (Brandon, 1990, p. 67-68). If our 
evolutionary predictions about cognitive function are so imprecise as not to distinguish 
the psychological equivalents of flying and climbing they will not be of any great value 
to cognitive science. We will suggest in section four that in order to make evolutionary 
predictions of the necessary precision it would be necessary to know not just a great deal 
about form, but also a great deal about development, since development determines the 
class of ‘solutions’ that are available for selection. 
 
Given the difficulty of analyzing evolutionary function in the absence of descriptive 
anatomy, it is reassuring to note that structural anatomy, and to a lesser but still 
considerable extent functional anatomy, made great strides before Darwin. In his work on 
the emotions, for example, Darwin relied on knowledge of the function of the facial 
muscles in emotional expression derived from the longstanding study of facial anatomy 
by artists and physicians. Functional anatomy is an important comparison case for 
Narrow Evolutionary Psychology, as it is the equivalent for other organs of the cognitive 
level of analysis of brain function that Narrow Evolutionary Psychology aims to bring 
into being. Functional anatomy describes the specific tasks performed by anatomical 
structures, tasks that could, at least in principle, be performed by other physical 
structures. Even after the widespread acceptance of Darwin’s theory it is unclear that 
evolutionary functional analysis has played a major role in functional anatomy. That is 
not to say that an evolutionary perspective has not been important. The comparative 
method has been recognized as one of the keys to progress in anatomy since the 
renaissance, and this method is on a firmer footing once taxonomy is based on 
evolutionary relationships. There are other relevant aspects of an evolutionary 
perspective too, as we will show below. But the predominant notion of function in 
functional anatomy does not seem to be evolutionary function (teleonomy). One 
observation in support of this idea is that scientists elucidating anatomical and 
physiological function do not experience a major discontinuity in their research practice 
when they move from those features that can plausibly be supposed to be adaptations to 
those that are ‘nothing but spandrels, chemistry and entropy’(Tooby and Cosmides, 1998, 
p. 195).  For example, some of the pairings between codons and amino acids that make 
up the genetic code and its variants are probably the result of selection for error 
minimization, whilst others are vestiges of chemical affinities in RNA world and other 
reflect the temporal sequence in which new amino acids became available for inclusion in 
polypeptides (Knight, Freeland, & Landweber, 1999). Yet exactly the same research 
practices will reveal the function of all these codons – what they code for - because a 
codon’s function is a matter of what the codon actually does and not why it does it. 
Similarly, anatomists do not usually withdraw claims about the functions of anatomical 
structures when presented with evidence that these are not the functions in virtue of 
which the structure was selected. The distinction between functions and mere effects, so 
critical to the evolutionary concept of function, does not seem critical for the practice of 
functional anatomy and physiology, or to the anatomical/physiological concept of 
function. This should not be surprising, since the evolutionary notion of function actually 
presupposes that the same functions can be identified in a way that says nothing about 
their evolution. The evolutionary functions of a trait are the ways it contributed to the 
fitness of ancestral organisms, that is to say, they are the functions assigned to the trait by 
a causal functional analysis of how those ancestral organisms survived and reproduced 
(Griffiths, 1993). The causal functional analysis of fitness is no different from the causal 
analysis of any other property of an organism, such as disease susceptibility: it merely 
identifies what the parts do in the overall causal mechanism. Ronald Amundson and 
George Lauder have discussed these issues in more detail and conclude that the 
predominant notion of function in the anatomical sciences is causal role function: the 
contribution made by a part of a mechanism to the causal capacity of the mechanism of 
which it is a part (Amundson and Lauder, 1994).  
 
We have argued that evolutionary functional analysis is too epistemically demanding to 
provide a short cut to understanding cognitive function and that other fields of functional 
anatomy do not rely on evolutionary functional analysis. But the problem identified by 
Narrow Evolutionary Psychology, and by ethologists like Lorenz, remains. The mind is 
an unusually complex system whose structure-function relationships are hard to 
determine. It would be profoundly useful to have a natural taxonomy of cognitive 
function to constrain hypotheses about function and to provide a structure within which 
to place empirical findings about function. Fortunately, there is an alternative source of 
such a natural taxonomy and, indeed, it is the one the ethologists originally had in mind.  
 
Niko Tinbergen famously proposed that there were four questions that could be asked 
about any behavioral trait (Tinbergen 1963): 
1. What is the evolutionary history of the behavior? 
2. What is the current use of the behavior in the life of the organism? 
3. How does the behavior develop over the life of the organism? 
4. What psychological and other mechanisms control the behavior?  
The four questions correspond to four explanatory projects in biology. The first, 
evolutionary, question is answered by phylogeny reconstruction and evolutionary 
modeling. The second question is an ecological one: it asks how the trait contributes to 
the organisms’ capacity to occupy its niche. There is a third question for developmental 
biology and a fourth for the cluster of anatomical and physiological disciplines, a cluster 
that includes experimental psychology and cognitive science.  
 
We have described the similarity between Narrow Evolutionary Psychology and Lorenz's 
view that the units of behavior studied by behavior analysis in the first half of the 
twentieth century were biologically meaningless and thus not a useful guide to the 
principles according to which the mind works. Unlike Narrow Evolutionary Psychology, 
however, Lorenz did not suggest that psychologists tackle Tinbergen’s first question and 
try to reconstruct evolution. He suggested that psychology tackle the second question and 
try to understand the ecological significance of behavior. In the context of animal 
behavior studies this amounted to studying behavior in something approximating a 
natural setting so as to be able to devise ‘ecologically valid tasks’ for later, controlled 
experimentation.  In effect, the ethologists recommended using an ecological taxonomy 
of behavior to structure research on behavior. We suggest that an ecological taxonomy of 
cognitive function can play the same role for cognitive science. The study of cognitive 
functioning can be illuminated by the causal functional analysis of the capacity of the 
mind to occupy its current niche. Interestingly, this comes close to some of the 
methodological practices adopted by current research in situated activity or ‘embodied 
mind’ research (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996: Chapter 14). 
 
We expect that adherents of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology will regard this as a 
ridiculous proposal - surely any meaningful account of an organism’s relations with its 
environment must classify the animals’ activities in terms of their adaptive function! But 
a moment's thought reveals that this picture is back-to-front. Theories of adaptive origins 
are generated by conducting a causal functional analysis of the capacity of the organism 
to survive and reproduce in an ancestral environment. The adaptive function of a trait is 
the function it is assigned in that analysis of pure causal function. If organism-
environment relations cannot be understood unless the traits of the organisms are 
classified in terms of their adaptive function, then the entire enterprise of adaptive 
explanation cannot get started. So a purely causal analysis of the ecological function of 
behavior must be possible without knowing its adaptive function. But the idea that there 
are coherent concepts of function other than evolutionary adaptive function seems to be 
very hard for Narrow Evolutionary Psychology advocates to assimilate. 
 
4 A Step-by-step Naturalization of Evolutionary Psychology 
The model of evolution used by Narrow Evolutionary Psychology is the received view 
that came out of the ‘modern synthesis’ of Mendelian genetics and natural selection 
(Figure 4.). This section attempts to enrich the model of evolution employed by Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology by adding some basic ingredients of naturalism to make it 
mechanistic, historical and developmental (see Section 1.2, above). 
 
Insert Figure 4. about here. 
 
We discuss a number of respects in which the traditional neo-Darwinian model of 
evolution fails to meet these desiderata. 1) It talks about form without having a theory of 
its genesis. 2) It expects a smooth fitness landscape for the mechanisms of mutation, 
sexual recombination, and selection to work upon, but has no explanation of the 
landscape itself. 3) It neglects important aspects of inheritance and makes the fact that 
humans have a high degree of cognitive flexibility and a complex system of cultural 
inheritance into an anomaly to be explained away. Finally, 4) it insists on selection as the 
'sole entropic force in nature' and ignores the other, well-established entropic forces 
whose existence is a precondition for selection to produce order. 
. 
4.1 Variation: The Origin of Form and Novelty in Evolution 
 
Natural selection depends on sorting through variants. Central to this kind of 
explanation is the historically realized sequence of variants. Selection shares 
explanatory force with the dynamics of variation. (Ahouse, 1998, p. 372) 
 
Darwin’s theory of evolution is a theory of descent with modification. It does not 
explain the genesis of form, but the trimmings of the form, once they are generated. 
(Kauffman, 2000, p. x) 
 
There is a glaring gap in Figure 4.: there is no reference to developmental biology or a 
theory of organization. Until this gap is filled, the model lacks an account of where 
phenotypes come from – an “evolutionary biology of organismic design” (Wagner, 1994, 
p. 276). In the adaptationist tradition, phenotypic variation is recognized as one of the 
main requirements of evolution, but its existence is rarely questioned or problematized. 
The capacity of developmental systems to generate variant forms that can solve adaptive 
problems enters the model only at the genetic level with the reference to mutation and 
recombination. There are well-known historical reasons for this. The ‘modern synthesis’ 
of Mendelian genetics and natural selection that put so many of the biological sciences on 
a common theoretical basis failed to include the science of developmental biology 
(Hamburger, 1980). The synthetic theory bypassed what were at the time intractable 
questions of the actual relationship between stretches of chromosome and phenotypic 
traits. Although it was accepted that genes must, in reality, generate phenotypic 
differences through interaction with other genes and other factors in development, genes 
were treated as ‘black boxes’ that could be relied on to produce the phenotypic variation 
with which they were known to correlate. The black-boxing strategy allowed the two 
tractable projects – theoretical population genetics and the study of selection at the 
phenotypic level – to proceed. Population genetics, the mathematical core of the modern 
synthesis, could postulate genes corresponding to phenotypic differences and track the 
effect of selection on these phenotypic variants at the genetic level. Selection could be 
studied at the phenotypic level on the assumption that variant phenotypes were generated 
in some unknown way by the genes and that phenotypic change would be tracked by 
change in gene frequencies. Within this framework, the only account that can be given of 
phenotypic variation is that it corresponds directly to mutation and recombination at the 
genetic level. Any actual structure to development, resulting from the processes hidden in 
the ‘black box’, will reveal itself only in the failure of selectionist reasoning based on the 
‘null hypothesis’ that no such structure exists. Like other pure adaptationist research 
programs, Narrow Evolutionary Psychology uses development only in this way, post hoc, 
to explain the lack of fit between a selective model and the data. 
 
The continued exclusion of developmental biology from the evolutionary synthesis in 
favor of the genetic program metaphor, however, can only be regarded as a ‘theoretical 
error of the first order’ (Strohman, 1997). The methodological limitations that 
necessitated the black box approach to the gene have now been overcome, largely as a 
result of the molecular revolution. The vibrant field of evolutionary developmental 
biology has created a positive role for developmental biology in evolution: 
developmental biology explains where phenotypes come from and, in doing so, reveals 
the natural units of biological form. As empirical research on the formation and 
transformation of body plans has shown, ontogenetic pathways are not necessarily 
conserved along with the adult body plan (Raff, 1996). The same seems to be true with 
respect to genetic mechanisms, which often fail to provide a reliable basis for a homology 
concept because of their loose correlation to morphological variation. It seems that 
structural homologues exist quasi-independently from their genetic and developmental 
causes (Wagner 1994,1995). Conversely, dramatic evolutionary changes in phenotypes 
can appear despite highly conserved patterns of genetic expression and processes of 
developmental organization (Mueller and Wagner, 1996). These findings support a view 
of homologies as “emergent stable patterns that can not be explained by stability at a 
more elementary level” (Wagner, 1995, p. 283). There seems to be a growing recognition 
that genomic sequence information is insufficient to determine the way gene products 
(proteins) interact to produce a mechanisms. In other words, genes in isolation contain 
insufficient information to determine gene function (Strohman, 1997). 
 
The main focus of current research in evolutionary developmental biology is on major 
structural features of the body. In principle, however, the exact same approach should be 
applicable to the evolution of the mind. There have been some attempts to explore this 
possibility in the recent literature. Experiments and statistical analyses in neurogenesis 
conducted by Barbara Finlay and her colleagues (2001) found that few direct links could 
be made between the size of different brain structures and differences in behavior 
between species. Their findings suggest that, contrary to the widespread assumptions of 
structure/function relationship, increases in the size of individual structure may not be 
closely related to special behavioral capacities. The most useful predictor of structure 
sizes of individual brain structures is the sizes of other brain structures, with some 
additional minor effects of taxonomic relationship and overall brain and body size, 
suggesting that selection is, indeed, ‘attacking a broader front’. 
 
Even a complete analysis of the adult brain, using the full array of current techniques 
in neuroscience, will leave unexamined central questions about the essential 
relationship between structure and function. The study of development promises 
unique insights into the nature of functional architecture. Likewise, patterns of 
comparative brain evolution show structure/function links in a different light than that 
cast by any one species. The problem we concern ourselves with here, then, is 
establishing the precise developmental substrate on which brain evolution selects. Do 
the brain and its information-gathering organs divide themselves up in evolution into 
components, modules, or circuits that can be the independent objects of special 
selection…? Or does selection attack a broader front, working change by adjusting the 
parameters of a "standard" developmental program? (Finlay, Darlington, & Nicastro, 
2001, pp.4-5 of preprint) 
 
We have referred to some of the new approaches to evolutionary explanation that are 
emerging from evolutionary developmental biology. The lesson to be drawn from these 
new approaches for evolutionary psychology is that the 'natural kinds' of behavior it seeks 
- and which Narrow Evolutionary Psychology claims to have found in innate and content 
rich, domain-specific modules - must be defined developmentally as well as functionally. 
Evolutionary psychology needs to account for the generation and fixation of traits.  The 
real lesson which evolutionary theory has for psychology is that a synthesis is needed 
between behavioral ecology and developmental psychology - not evolutionary 
psychology, but evolutionary developmental psychology. 
 
4.2 Evolvability conditions: Quasi-Independence and Continuity 
The mechanisms of generation and fixation (or integration) are two steps in the direction 
of building stable units of characters. However, they are only two steps in the production 
of natural units of biological form. An essential third step in the production of adaptive 
developmental organization is the decoupling of previously integrated parts into quasi-
autonomous units:  
 
[The phenomena of adaptation] can only be workable if both the selection between 
character states and reproductive fitness have two characteristics: continuity and 
quasi-independence. Continuity means that small changes in a characteristic must 
result in only small changes in ecological relations: a very slight change in fin shape 
cannot cause a dramatic change in sexual recognition or make the organism suddenly 
attractive to new predators. Quasi-independence means that there is a great variety of 
alternative paths by which a given characteristic may change, so that some of them 
will allow selection to act on this characteristic without altering other characteristics of 
the organism in a countervailing fashion; pleiotropic and allometric relations must be 
changeable. Continuity and quasi-independence are the most fundamental 
characteristics of the evolutionary process. Without them organisms as we know them 
could not exist because adaptive evolution would have been impossible. (Lewontin, 
1978, p. 230) 
 
Empirical evidence has shown that structurally or phylogenetically homologous 
characters can be the outcome of quite different developmental pathways (Hall, 1994; 
Wagner, 1994,1995; Wray & Raff, 1991; Bolker & Raff 1996) Even if we find similar 
patterns of ontogeny across different taxa these might turn out to be nothing more than 
‘crossing nodes’ of developmental pathways coming from and going in quite different 
directions. Striking examples come in the form of directly developing amphibians that 
'leap over' the usual larval stage or the apparent ease with which genus Patriella starfish 
species switch from producing small pelagic larvae to producing larger, directly 
developing benthic offspring (Palumbi, 1997). The concept that makes such phenomena 
consistent with the equally compelling evidence that developmental structure shapes 
variation is developmental modularity. Development is an integrated and integrative 
process as much as structures are interactively and hierarchically organized; yet 
structures as well as their underlying mechanisms can be decomposed into dissociable 
‘building blocks’ (Brandon, 1999). 
 
Two aspects are of importance, the individualization of characters allowing the free 
combination between individualized building blocks, and constraints acting against the 
variation of the character. The operational problem with separated body parts is how to 
distinguish between an adequate and a less or inadequate 'atomization' of the organism. 
This problem is at the center of organismic or morphological biology. What is being 
sought are mechanisms responsible for the creation and maintenance of the evolutionary 
units in questions. These are locally acting self-regulating mechanisms during the 
development of the organism that cause the differentiation of the organs. Most of them 
are well known: self-assembly, fixation of temporal patterns, and spontaneous pattern 
formation. Interestingly, these mechanisms differ in their causal role for constructing and 
maintaining organismic features. There are passive structures as well as actively 
maintained ones, determined by different causal factors. These results of developmental 
biology have led to the proposal that there are two quite different regulatory processes 
responsible for the construction of organic characters and the determination of their 
structural identity in spite of developmental perturbations: morphogenetic and 
morphostatic cellular mechanisms. Research on developmental modularity can explain 
how to pick the right traits out of such a complex organization as organisms; how, so to 
speak, to carve nature at its joints.  
 
These results are able to reconcile the existence of apparently solid developmental 
constraints with apparently variable developmental pathways and are a big step towards a 
theory of morphological evolution. The modularity concept2 provides an answer to the 
problem of how genotypic conditions are represented at the phenotype level (the 
genotype-phenotype map), and how phenotypic conditions are represented at the level of 
the organism’s fitness (the phenotype-fitness map). Hence the concept of developmental 
modularity explains how continuity and quasi-independence are achieved, but only, of 
course, by characters that reflect the real, modular structure of development. Once again, 
the moral is that a genuinely evolutionary psychology cannot focus on the adaptive 
advantages of certain phenotypes and leave the genes to take care of the rest. 
Understanding how the mind grows is critical to determining how it might have evolved. 
 
                                                 
2 It is ironic that two such closely related fields as Narrow Evolutionary Psychology and Evolutionary 
Developmental Biology should make such different uses of the concept of ‘modularity’. NEP has a 
theoretical argument for the existence of modules: it would be difficult to optimize a mind for any one 
adaptive problem if the same mind is used to solve many problems. NEP modules are postulated on the 
basis of thinking about the structure of ancestral environments and evidence for their existence is provided 
by domain specific effects in cognitive performance. EDB has its own theoretical argument: modules 
explain how structures can be altered one at a time. But these structures need not (although they can) 
correspond to single adaptive functions and so must be discovered empirically, rather than via ‘adaptive 
thinking’. Evidence for specific modules can take the form of ‘developmental constraints’ inferred from 
comparative biology or of direct evidence about how the phenotype develops. The EDB view of modules 
makes it obvious that the modular structure of the organism shapes the course of evolution, as well as being 
shaped by it, whereas the NEP view overlooks this fact, as discussed in Section 3 above. 
4.3 Extended Inheritance  
What we can conclude from the preceding section is that developmental mechanisms, 
which are to a certain degree emergent mechanisms with respect to their genetic basis, 
determine where one, quasi-independent evolutionary character ends and the next begins. 
That leads us to the question of the heritability of such mechanisms: their stability and 
reliable presence at the next generation. Have we not all learned that only genetic 
variations are of any interest to evolution since these are the ones that can be picked out 
by natural selection? How does this leave us with respect to the interaction of evolution 
and development? 
 
Cosmides and Tooby give a suitably interactivist description of the relationship between 
genes and environment: 
 
The cognitive architecture, like all aspects of the phenotype from molars to memory 
circuits, is the joint product of genes and environment. … [Evolutionary 
Psychologists] do not assume that genes play a more important role in development 
than the environment does, or that "innate factors" are more important than "learning". 
Instead, [Evolutionary Psychologists] reject these dichotomies as ill-conceived. 
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1997, p. 16) 
 
So far so good. But in practice, this partnership can be very one sided: 
 
The genes allow the environment to influence the development of the phenotype […] 
genes are simply regulatory elements, molecules that arrange their surrounding 
environment into an organism. … To learn, there must be some mechanism that causes 
it, the mechanism that causes it must itself be unlearned - must be "innate". (Tooby 
and Cosmides, 1997, pp. 17-18) 
 
One needs to go a bit further to do justice to gene-environment interaction. Obviously, 
talk of ‘innate mechanisms’ only disguises the fact that the mechanism itself has to 
develop. Even the most fundamental mechanisms have to be constructed by the 
controlled expression of gene products. That expression relies on a wide range of causal 
factors, which is why normal development can be so easily perturbed (of course, most 
such perturbations are pathological, but so are most perturbations due to mutation.) It is 
commonly argued that the presence of the right genes must be what explains evolved 
traits, because genes are the only things organisms inherit from their ancestors. But a 
principled definition of inheritance does not yield this result (Griffiths and Gray, 2001). 
Organisms inherit an extended range of resources that interact to reconstruct the 
organism's life cycle. Some of these resources are familiar--chromosomes, nutrients, 
ambient temperatures, childcare. Others are less familiar, despite the recent explosion of 
work on "epigenetic inheritance" (Jablonka and Lamb, 1995). These include chromatin 
marks that regulate gene expression, cytoplasmic chemical gradients, and gut- and other 
endosymbionts.  
 
Another important topic in recent biology is the participation of the organism in the 
construction of its niche (Odling-Smee, 1996). Hence a further aspect of inheritance is 
the local physical environments, altered by past generations of the same species and other 
species as well as the organism's own activities. Many of these inherited resources have 
distinctive roles. DNA is unique in acting as templates for protein synthesis. Membranes 
are unique in acting as templates for the assembly of proteins into more membrane. 
Chemical traces from foraging play a characteristic role in diet choice in many rodents. 
These empirical differences between what DNA does and what other factors do are real 
and important, but do not map onto any deeper, more metaphysical distinctions, such as 
that between form and matter or, as Cosmides and Tooby suggest, between factors which 
do the arranging and factors that are arranged. 
 
4.4. Development as adaptation, or giving genes a break 
Extended inheritance is an important element of the explanation of evolved traits. But it 
also serves to break down unnecessarily sharp distinctions between evolutionary 
adaptations and ontogenetic adaptation to the current environment. Narrow Evolutionary 
Psychology claims to have done this too, via the idea that development explores a tree of 
possibilities encoded in the genes, but this simply creates a sharp dichotomy between 
encoded outcomes triggered by the environment and outcomes that are not encoded and 
hence not subject to evolutionary explanation at all. The role of development in the 
Narrow Evolutionary Psychology is little more sophisticated than it was in the 'open 
program' model of the 1940s: Genes do not just code for a suitable reaction to a particular 
stimulus, they code for an 'open' program that has a range of suitable reactions, each 
adapted to one of several previously experienced environments. The 'program' must 
foresee all possible problems with ready solutions as appropriate reactions. If that were 
what cognitive development is like, then we would have a new evolutionary paradox: 
why did evolution invent complex and costly features like a mind and an extended period 
of post-natal development, while making no more use of them than to detect a few cues 
and respond with predetermined solutions to previously solved problems? 
 
In the human case, we are dealing with the evolution of 1) a massively extended period of 
development - childhood, 2) an extended organ for the processing of ad hoc information - 
cognition, 3) the ability to form and perform complex social interaction - sociality, and 4) 
the capacity to produce a new kind of environment made out of rites, public knowledge 
and tradition and preserved by new ways of transmission- culture. According to Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology, or at least according to its oft-proclaimed account of the role of 
genes and environment in development, these processes do not allow humans to cope 
with genuinely novel environments at all - they merely serve to choose from a suite of 
pre-specified adaptations on the basis of environmental cues.  
 
In contrast to Narrow Evolutionary Psychology, the traditional view is that the function 
of these processes is to react to all sorts of 'adaptive problems' on the spot without the 
necessity to wait for multi-generational feedback to build another option into the 
developmental program. Development, cognition, and culture, it is argued, have been 
adapted for creating novel adaptive behavior. But traditionally, this new domain of 
adaptation has been seen as isolated from explanation by natural selection, as Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology constantly points out and rails against. Embracing extended 
inheritance and a richer model of the role of non-genetic resources in development makes 
it possible to accept the traditional view of the role of cognition and culture without 
drawing a sharp line between adaptation by natural selection and adaptation via cognition 
and culture. The new mechanisms of adaptation can be 'tweaked' and biased in all sorts of 
ways by adaptive evolution, as in, to choose the simplest example, the phenomenon of 
'prepared learning' (Seligman and Hager, 1972). Evolution for flexibility can interact with 
evolution for bias and for stronger forms of canalization in many combinations, and 
evolutionary explanations of cognitive traits can take equally many forms. 
 
4.5 Selection, Order and Adaptation  
 
Adaptations are the accumulated output of selection, and selection is the single 
significant anti-entropic ordering force orchestrating functional organic design. 
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 55, our emphasis) 
 
Thus, chance and selection, the two components of the evolutionary process, explain 
different types of design properties in organisms, and all aspects of design must be 
attributed to one of these two forces. Complex functional organization is the product 
and signature of selection. (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 63, our emphasis) 
 
These are typical statements of the idea that order must either be explained by selection 
or put down to mere chance. Random mutation and natural selection are the only possible 
explanations of order. Sometimes, this seems to be a sort of definition. If a trait's function 
is the role for which it has been selected and an adaptation is an outcome of natural 
selection, then it is trivially true that natural selection is the sole explanation of function 
and adaptation in nature. But this is an empty victory, since on these definitions there is 
much order (negentropy) in nature that is not obviously 'functional' or 'adaptive'. Narrow 
Evolutionary Psychology tries to obscure this by redefining negentropy itself as 
functional design (!), but this is profoundly unhelpful in understanding either negentropic 
processes in general or natural selection in particular.  In this section we argue that not 
only do other negentropic forces exist, their existence is part of what makes possible 
natural selection and the further order that it produces. 
 
The claim that nature is mainly entropic is a common prejudice and rests on a simple 
misinterpretation of the second law of thermodynamics. The growing science of 
complexity and complex adaptive systems has taught us that only closed systems are 
progressively chaotic (equilibrated), whilst open systems (including all living systems) 
are far-from-equilibrium and dissipative. The main neg(ative) entropic force in nature is 
self-organization, the exploitation of external energy for the production of order. The 
main mechanism is the production of energy gradients and the constrained release of 
energy: critically interacting components naturally tend to self-organize, and many of 
these self-organizing systems are able to perform physical work by means of internal 
constraints on the release of energy. Constraints are hyperstable structures sensitive to –
and hence containing information about - relevant displacements from equilibrium that 
can be useful sources of energy from which work can be extracted (wind blowing or 
water flowing in on direction, concentrated heat sources like the sun, food as high-energy 
cluster of matter, etc.). They allow the constrained or directed release of this energy into a 
small number of degrees of freedom for the production of order (for example further 
constraints). Hence constraints in general are anti-entropic forces in nature, and natural 
selection – or external constraint - is just one of them.     
 
Natural selection occurs whenever there are individuals with differential fitness. The 
causal processes involved here, obviously, are the systematic contributions of heritable 
traits to the reproduction of individuals. So natural selection is the overall outcome of a 
range of causal processes taking place at the level of the organism and causing survival 
and reproduction. Selection itself - differential survival and reproduction - is a 
widespread phenomenon not only in biology but also in the physical, chemical or cultural 
realms, but it rarely seems to lead to the increasing adaptive complexity that is so striking 
in the biological realm. So the question arises: what is so special about organisms that 
selection upon them results in adaptive evolution? First, they are open, dissipative 
systems extracting order from the environment by means of self-organization that allows 
them to maintain and at the same time adapt themselves to internal and external 
perturbation, and to reproduce themselves. These distinctive capacities are those that 
several recent authors have claimed as the defining properties of living systems 
(Christensen and Hooker, in press, Kauffman, 1993; Hooker, 1995; Weber and Depew, 
1996). From this perspective, self-organization is not an alternative force competing with 
natural selection but the complementary force that creates systems capable of achieving 
adaptive complexity through evolution by natural selection. Self-organization can act 
locally as a force that resists selection - an internal fitness function drives the system to a 
particular attractor in its state space and holds it there in the face of mutation, thus 
preventing a response to selective forces. But when we look at the process on a larger 
scale, natural selection, by maximizing some external fitness function, is acting to move a 
population of systems in a population-level state space by choosing between individuals 
sitting at different attractors. Selection requires alternative, stably self-organized systems 
to choose between on the basis of the resultant (phenotypic) properties. Applying external 
fitness criteria is certainly important in producing what we call complex adaptation. 
However, at that stage a lot of necessary work on the way to a functioning organism has 
already been done by internal fitness criteria guiding the process of self-organization. 
These internal organizational processes are negentropic, not entropic, contrary to the 
frequent assertions of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology: 
 
Finally, of course, entropic effects of many types act to introduce functional disorder 
into the design of organisms. They are recognizable by the lack of coordination that 
they produce within the architecture or between it and the environment, as well as by 
the fact that they frequently vary between individuals. Classes of entropic processes 
include mutation, evolutionary unprecedented environmental change, individual 
exposure to unusual circumstances, and developmental accidents. (Tooby and 
Cosmides, 1992, p. 63, our emphasis) 
 
Applying this line of reasoning to classic examples in developmental biology produces 
quite bizarre results. On what possible account of 'entropy' does perturbing Drosophilia 
development to produce the bithorax phenotype, either by mutation or by developmental 
shock, increase the entropy in the system? A bithorax Drosophila is at least as highly 
ordered as a wild-type Drosophila. The answer, of course, is an account that mixes up 
adaptive function and entropy in the phrase 'functional disorder'. But this redefinition is 
profoundly unhelpful. Selection can sometimes favor increased disorder, as in the 
evolution of vestigial traits, and order can arise without selection, as complexity theory 
amply demonstrates. There are any numbers of sound theoretical reasons to keep the 
concepts of order and functional design distinguished and no reasons we can see to run 
them together like this. 
 
The application to evolution of complexity theory with its focus on systems dynamics 
and self-organization could shift our view from natural selection to a more inclusive 
vision of 'natural construction' by offering tools to integrate organizational dynamics into 
evolutionary theory. We can re-conceptualize natural selection as a result of the 
interaction of system and environment, and adaptation as the mutual interactive 
construction of the organism and its environment. Evolution can then be understood as 
change in the constitution and distribution of developmental systems. The developmental 
system is an organism-environment complex that changes over both ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic time. There is no need to attribute so much power to an external mover 
(natural selection) or to an independent internal force (genes and their mutations) that you 
deprive the organism of all its active control (Oyama, 1992; Stotz, 1999). This makes 
possible the re-interpretation of organisms as the active source of the emergent properties 
of life by means of interaction and construction, and marks a shift from focusing on the 
products of processes (like genotypes, traits, or gene frequencies) to the processes 
themselves. 
 
5. Conclusion: Naturalism and 'Design' 
 
There is nothing wrong with focusing on the concept of function. The possession of 
function and functional organization is indeed a paradigmatic property of living beings. 
Function, however, treated as a serious theoretical concept rather than a rhetorical frill, 
has remained the exclusive domain of biology, psychology and sociology and, of course, 
the study of human artifacts. This suggests that function is an emergent property in need 
of explanation in terms of more basic organizational principles. A major point of the last 
section was that function in biology cannot simply be reduced to random mutation and 
natural selection. It is the role of development to supplement those basics to give an 
adequate account of the origin of adaptive complexity. Development is needed because 
the design analogy mischaracterizes evolution. Here lies the deep commonality in the 
shortcomings of the explanatory strategies of evolutionary theory and traditional 
cognitive science, and therefore of the Narrow Evolutionary Psychology that brings these 
two traditions together - they have bypassed development with its nonrandom and 
contingent processes of organization. Evolution and development are based on 
nonrandom physical processes that are able to link matter, energy and information to 
perform autocatalysis, reproduction, and physical work. Like evolution, development is a 
contingent, historical processes in which one step sets the stage for the next without 
going beyond that to determine the eventual outcome. This outcome will be the result of 
an interactive and constructive process of a system in its relation to its environment.  
 
A properly epigenetic perspective on evolution and cognition should not presuppose the 
existence of any property that should rather be the subject of explanation. This implies 
the definition of mind-like behavior without ultimate reference to internal representation, 
and the definition of life without ultimate reference to teleological function. There is 
neither a natural designer who predefined the function or meaning of behavior, nor a last 
representational homunculus at the very end of the process of reference. Life processes 
are to be explained without reference to an ultimate, teleological function, just as 







































Figure 2. The three ‘Marrtian’ levels of analysis in cognitive science. 
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Figure 3. Evolutionary reasoning from one Marrtian level of analysis to another. Adapted 
from (Cosmides et al. 1992: 10) and (Tooby and Cosmides 1997: 2). 
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· Variation = mutation, recombination 
· Heredity = genetic transmission 
· Fitness = propensity to survive and reproduce,  
· Natural Selection = differential survival and reproduction 
· Adaptation = the outcome of natural selection 
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